Note: This analysis is part of our series on geopolitical tensions in digital policy. The series starts by dissecting a recent US memorandum that scrutinises different types of foreign digital policy. Topical pieces, including this, then distill the global state of affairs and explain the cause of geopolitical tensions in one type of digital policy.

“They won USD 15 or 16 billion from Apple. They won billions from Google. I think they’re after Facebook for billions and billions. These are American companies. Whether you like them or not, they’re — they’re American companies, and they shouldn’t be doing that. And that’s — as far as I’m concerned, it’s a form of taxation.”

Donald Trump, World Economic Forum, 23 January 2025

The enforcement of digital policy is central to geopolitical tensions. Three days into his second presidency, US President Trump compared the EU’s fines against US companies to taxes. A few weeks later, the recent US memorandum stated that the US administration will impose tariffs and other responses when foreign governments impose a “fine, penalty, tax, or other burden that is discriminatory, disproportionate, or designed to transfer significant funds or intellectual property from American companies.” Below, we outline how governments are enforcing digital policies and why this contributes to geopolitical tensions, based on the Digital Policy Alert database.

The Digital Policy Alert has documented 1818 enforcement developments across the globe, as of 26 March 2025. This includes investigations or lawsuits by governments at the national and EU level. 

The dataset provides an overview of global enforcement action affecting the digital economy:

• The most active governments included the US (276), the EU (185), the Republic of Korea (135), Italy (100), the UK (95), and Russia (97).

• In terms of policy areas, enforcement action most frequently concerned data governance (624), competition (475), consumer protection (283), and content moderation (272).

• Regarding the current status, 1129 enforcement developments were concluded or in force. Most often, rulings incurred some form of consequence for the targeted company, such as fines or behavioural remedies. Rarely, enforcement action was closed without consequences for the company. 681 enforcement developments were still under way. A small minority of cases were rejected or terminated. 

 The dataset also informs on the sectors and specific companies targeted by enforcement:

• The most targeted sectors of the digital economy included user-generated content platforms (351), e-commerce platforms (251), other online platforms (244), and other service providers (218).

• The specific companies mentioned most often include Alphabet (191, including Google), Meta (186, including Facebook, Meta, Instagram, Whatsapp, and Threads), Amazon (73), Apple (72), ByteDance (67, including TikTok), X (66, including Twitter), Microsoft (45), Booking (25), OpenAI (17, including ChatGPT), Uber (15).

The granularity of the dataset allows for regulatory practices deemed to be discriminatory, enabling a comparison of different governments’ enforcement action into specific companies: 

• Most cases against Alphabet stemmed from Russia (26), the EU (17), Italy (15), the UK (13) and the US (11). For Meta, the most active jurisdictions were the EU (26) Italy (23), Brazil (14), the US (13), Australia (11), and Ireland (9).

• For Alphabet, the most common policy areas were competition (79), data governance (51), and content moderation (46). Enforcement against Meta concerned the same policy areas, in a different order: data governance (65), content moderation (64), and competition (36).

• For other firms, the dataset showed that the US was most actively enforcing against Amazon, while, for Apple, half of the cases were still ongoing. For both Amazon and Apple, enforcement action overwhelmingly concerned competition rules.

If tensions concerning the enforcement of digital policies escalate, the trigger will likely be a substantial fine against a US company. Some of the abovementioned enforcement actions have resulted in fines exceeding USD 1 billion. They include: 

• The Irish Data Protection Commission’s EUR 1.2 billion fine against Meta, for unlawful personal data transfers to the US by Facebook;

• The Italian Competition Authority’s EUR 1.1 billion fine against Amazon, for abusing its market dominance by favouring third-party sellers that used Amazon's logistical services in the Amazon “buy box”;

• The European Commission’s EUR 4.3 billion fine against Google, which was subsequently reduced to EUR 4.1 billion by the European Court of Justice, for abusing its market power in the search engine market;

• The People's Bank of China’s CNY 7.1 billion fine against Ant Group, for violating financial consumer protection laws and anti-money laundering obligations, among others; and

• A Russian fine against Google, which has accrued to the point of exceeding global GDP. The fine combines cumulative penalties for terminating a Russian media organisation’s Google account and for Google’s allegedly biased and non-transparent content moderation rules.

• Two US enforcement actions, against crypto platforms FTX and Terraform Labs, which resulted in orders to pay USD 12.7 billion and USD 4.5 billion, respectively.

Currently, attention lies on the EU’s upcoming enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA), which could lead to substantial fines for US companies. Under the DSA, the EU is reportedly considering a fine against X, while DMA cases against Apple and Meta are pending. Both frameworks allow for substantial fines that could exceed the USD 1 billion mark and cause further tensions.

The US president has rapidly adopted the narrative that the enforcement of digital policy is a form of taxation. This narrative has, in turn, seeped into policy documents: The memorandum considers foreign enforcement action to be “extortion” and “unfair” and claims that its goal is to “prop up failed foreign economies.” 

The perspective appears to be that foreign governments target US companies disproportionately, for self-serving purposes. This can refer to the number of enforcement actions pursued or the height of the fines issued. Whether this perspective holds true and, if so, could be explained by the importance and size of US companies in the digital economy, is beyond the scope of this analysis. Regardless, foreign governments’ enforcement action against US companies will be scrutinised, moving forward. 

Governments will react differently to this scrutiny. Some will emphasise that enforcement action represents the legitimate implementation of sovereign national rules and double down. Some will proceed with enforcement action, but recalibrate the penalties for US companies. For instance, some may opt for behavioural remedies – that are no less burdensome for companies but may attract less unwanted attention from the US government than fines. Others will wait, stalling ongoing and refraining from new enforcement action. 

The memorandum does not explicitly mention enforcement action in its instructions to US authorities, but demands that authorities analyse discriminatory regulatory practices by foreign governments. Specifically, the Treasury Secretary, the Commerce Secretary, and the US Trade Representative will jointly identify practices that “discriminate against, disproportionately affect, or otherwise undermine the global competitiveness or intended operation” of US companies. The authorities will also recommend actions to counter such practices. The results will be provided by the US Trade Representative in April 2025.

Foreign governments preparing for these next steps can shape their reaction actively, which presents a double-edged sword. The memorandum focuses mainly on policy approaches that are already enshrined in law. For instance, online content or tax regimes require a legislative process to be amended. When it comes to enforcement action, government authorities are in control, especially since a large number of cases are still ongoing. On the one hand, government authorities can thus react to tensions, for instance by delaying or reducing, or increasing, fines. On the other hand, such politicisation of enforcement action can contribute to further geopolitical tensions.